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Managers must decide whether to grant their employees the freedom to make their own 
choices or to restrict their employees’ decision rights by proscribing specific actions, 
behaviors and decisions. Prior research finds that employees perceive restrictive controls 
as a signal that their manager does not trust them to behave appropriately. While this might 
be true sometimes, I argue that an employee’s belief as to why a restriction was imposed 
could depend on contextual factors, such as how competitive the workplace is. Specifically, 
I predict that, compared settings where there is little peer competition or the competition is 
not salient, experiencing stronger peer competition will push employees to view a 
restrictive control through a lens of how it affects their performance relative to their peers, 
increasing the likelihood that employees will view a restrictive control as improving 
fairness. If so, employees might respond positively to the imposition of a restrictive control 
rather than negatively, as suggested by prior research. The results of a laboratory 
experiment suggest that employee reactions to a control decision depends not only on the 
presence of peer competition, but also on the perceived cost incurred by management to 




CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizations use a myriad of controls and other tools to influence employee 
behavior, collectively described as management control systems (MCS), to help 
organizations reach their goals. One important design choice of a MCS is whether to grant 
employees the freedom to make their own decisions and choose their own actions and 
behaviors or to directly restrict the range of actions, decisions, and behaviors employees 
may engage in via a restrictive control. For example, a pharmaceutical company could 
accept their salespersons’ reports identifying the number of potential customers they meet 
with each week. Alternatively, the company could verify their salespersons’ reports by 
using GPS tracking or directly following up with the potential customers (e.g., Puri 2019). 
This restrictive control would increase the chances of future revenue streams for the 
organization as well as reduce the risk that a given salesperson fall below their individual 
sales targets. Nevertheless, a growing body of research suggests that the use of restrictive 
controls may lead to negative unintended consequences. 
 Prior research suggests that when managers directly restrict employee behavior, 
those employees respond in ways that are counterproductive to the organization such as by 
slacking off, engaging in sabotage, or directly stealing from the organization (e.g., Falk 
and Kosfeld 2006). Christ (2013) shows that these negative behavioral responses occur 
when the employee views the control (1) as a mechanism that reduces their own autonomy 
and (2) as a signal that management does not trust them to behave appropriately otherwise. 
These behavioral costs to using restrictive controls increase as the coerciveness of the 




this relationship were conducted under stark settings where there was little to no 
opportunity (i.e., other organizational context) for employees to view the restrictions as 
anything other than a signal of distrust. I look to investigate whether an organization 
feature, the strength or saliency of peer competition, affects how employees view and 
respond to restrictive controls. 
 Peer competition is when individuals, at the same hierarchical level, are trying to 
perform better than each other in a similar or equivalent task. This competition can arise 
naturally within an organization’s culture or can be induced by an organization’s 
performance evaluation system. While the intentional induction of peer competition has 
been found to affect employee behavior and organizational performance (e.g., Tafkov 
2013), it is helpful to understand how peer competition affects the efficacy of other MCS 
levers. These levers do not exist in a vacuum (Libby, Rennekamp & Seybert 2015), but are 
part of a network of controls that should work in accord with each other. In this study, I am 
interested in understanding how the intensity of peer competition affects employee 
perceptions and reactions to management’s decision to use or not use restrictive controls.  
I investigate this question using an experiment in which student participants were 
randomly placed into groups of four, with three assigned to the role of employee and one 
assigned to the role of manager. The employees generated wealth for the organization 
(group of four participants) by performing a real-effort task. The employees reported their 
performance to the manager, which included an opportunity to misreport their own 
performance to benefit themselves. Before the real-effort task, the manager could choose 
to restrict employees’ reporting behavior ex ante by requiring a completely accurate 




decision and reporting their performance, employees had the opportunity to benefit or harm 
the manager in a follow up real-effort task. I manipulated whether employees earnings 
depended upon their peer employees’ performance in the initial task and whether 
employees were matched with a manager who chose to enact the restrictive control.  
I argue that peer competition shifts employee focus from the manager to their peer 
employees, causing them to think about how the restrictive control affects themselves in 
relation to their peers. As a result, in settings where peer competition is quite strong or 
salient employees will view the restrictive control as more beneficial because the restriction 
is restricting their peers from overreporting thus increasing the fairness of the competition. 
In contrast, with weak or low peer competition, employees are less likely to focus on their 
peer employees, thus are less likely to perceive a benefit from the imposition of a restrictive 
control. Thus, I predict that, in a follow up task, employees experiencing strong 
competition will reward their manager more (less) than employees experiencing weak 
competition when their manager chose to (not) impose a restrictive control. 
Results from two experiments largely support my predictions. In the first 
experiment, findings show that when managers chose to restrict employees, employees 
under strong peer competition rewarded their manager more in a subsequent task than 
employees under weak peer competition. However, in the first experiment, all managers 
elected to deploy the restrictive control (i.e., require a completely honest performance 
report).  
To ensure the findings in the first experiment were a result of peer competition 




experiment with the aim of increasing managers’ propensity to choose to NOT impose the 
restrictive control. To encourage this decision, a fee was assessed to those managers who 
did choose to restrict employees. This change in the second experiment was successful in 
encouraging a significant proportion of manager participants to not restrict their 
employees, thus allowing me to observe the conditions that went unobserved in the first 
experiment.  
In this newly observed condition (i.e., managers choosing not to restrict 
employees), as predicted, employees under strong peer competition rewarded their 
manager less than employees operating under weak peer competition. However, when the 
manager did choose to restrict employees in the second experiment, employee responses 
were opposite to those under the same manipulation in the first experiment. Specifically, 
opposite to my prediction, in the second experiment employees under strong peer 
competition rewarded their manager less than employees under weak peer competition. 
Incorporating results from both experiments, these findings provide some indication that 
the fee assessed on managers, in the second experiment, when imposing the restrictive 
control appears to affect employee behavior. I provide a post-hoc theoretical discussion of 
this unexpected finding in the Results section. 
I contribute to the literature in several ways. First, prior literature investigating the 
behavioral effects of intra-organizational controls has primarily focused on the cost or 
downside to using controls. This study adds to the literature by identifying an 
organizational feature, peer competition, that can cause employees to be more receptive to 
a restrictive control, thus leading to more positive uncontracted employee behavior. In 




with the general takeaway being when a manager restricts employees, employees see this 
decision as a signal the manager does not trust them. This study looks to understand how 
a different other-regarding preference, fairness, affects employee responses to managerial 
control choices. I find evidence that, under certain circumstances, when employees are 
under strong competitive settings, a restrictive control may be seen by employees as 
promoting fairness. 
I also contribute to the performance evaluation literature. Prior research indicates 
that managers should consider features of the task (e.g., systematic noise in the task, 
sabotage capabilities) when deciding whether and to what degree to utilize relative 
performance in evaluations. This study suggests organizations should also consider what 
types of controls they plan to influence employees with when deciding how much to 
incorporate relative performance in evaluating these employees. In addition, while not a 
research question of the study, I find evidence that the amount of cost incurred by the 
organization to impose controls over employees appears to affect employees’ perceptions 





CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Restrictive Controls 
 A goal of MCS is to gather and distribute information to both influence and 
facilitate employee behavior (Baiman and Demski 1980). One of these levers is deciding 
whether to delegate employees the right to make their own decisions and choose their own 
behaviors and actions or to directly restrict these employees’ actions via a restrictive 
control (e.g., Indjejikian and Matĕjka 2012). Other terms have been used to describe similar 
forms of controls including action control (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012) and 
behavioral control (Christ et al. 2008). Restrictive controls can take many forms such as 
requiring specific procedures or processes, monitoring, reviews, and approval 
requirements. The fundamental goal of these controls is to ensure employees act in the best 
interest of the organization.  
 Harris and Raviv (1979) show that such monitoring procedures can provide value 
if (1) agents are risk averse and (2) the relationship between effort and performance is 
noisy. However, because a manager(s) decides to impose such a restriction, employees may 
make attributions about the manager from their decision, potentially influencing employee 
subsequent actions that affect the manager. Stiglitz (1975) notes that there may be negative 
consequences to restricting employees, ex ante. An economic argument for this is the idea 
of employees learning from their experiences. For example, Ichino and Muehlheusser 




forced to do the “appropriate” action, employees will not learn how to determine what the 
appropriate action is without prescriptive guidance. 
 Behavioral models have also suggested that restrictive controls may also lead to 
negative consequences, specifically via the principal-agent relationship. Frey (1993) 
suggests that restricting employees can send a signal that the manager does not trust 
employees to engage in “appropriate” behaviors without the restriction present (also see 
Sliwka 2007). Given prior evidence and theory showing individuals’ preference for being 
viewed as trustworthy (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995), this sense of distrust may 
lead employees to withhold effort, or more generally respond negatively. This negative 
response could be achieved in the restricted task by performing the minimum required or 
via other employee roles that do not have similar restrictions.  
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) provide some of the first experimental evidence of this 
phenomena. Specifically, they find that employees exert less total effort when they are 
required to put forth a minimum amount of effort versus when no minimum is set, 
effectively harming the manager who put the minimum in place. Importantly, employees 
respond this way when the manager actively sets this requirement as opposed to the 
requirement being randomly imposed, suggesting that employees punish the manager for 
their decision, and not for the benefit the manager accrues from the control. Interestingly, 
when there is uncertainty as to who imposed the restriction (i.e., the minimum 
requirement), employees tend to give the benefit of doubt and not hold the potential culprit 
(i.e., the manager) accountable (Christ 2013). This suggests that as firms dissociate the 
decision to control employees from a specific manager or individual, counterproductive 




In addition, prior theory suggests that when such restrictions are placed over a 
larger number of individuals perceptions of distrust may dissipate. The theory argues that 
a given employee is likely to attribute the control decision to the manager distrusting their 
peers, or at least the group as a whole on average, instead of distrusting the employee in 
question, via a self-serving bias (e.g., Mezulis et al. 2004). However, Garrett (2017) finds 
that individuals still reduce effort whether a group of employees or just an individual 
employee are restricted at a time intimating that egocentrism can sometimes overpower 
self-serving attributions in organizational control settings. Thus, the extant literature seems 
to suggest that as long as an identifiable manager is choosing to impose the restriction, 
employees will react negatively, regardless of the breadth of the restriction. 
2.2 Peer Competition 
 Peer competition, sometimes referred to as horizontal competition (e.g., Luft 2016), 
is when individuals strive to outperform others at the same hierarchical level in an 
equivalent or similar task. Peer competition can be induced explicitly by an organization’s 
MCS and/or performance evaluation system. For example, a manager can choose to award 
a bonus to the salesperson with the most sales dollars in a set period of time (i.e., a 
tournament incentive scheme). Alternatively, peer competition can develop naturally in 
organizations wherever resources or opportunities are saliently limited. For example, 
organizations often compare peer employees in selecting individuals for promotion or 
compare project proposals to determine which project to allocate limited capital resources 




Peer competition has been found to increase employee effort by harnessing 
individuals’ risk aversion. Specifically, because employee rewards, monetary or otherwise, 
are determined not only by their own performance but also by the performance of their 
peers, an uncontrollable factor, employees exert more effort to increase their chances of 
accruing the reward (Lazear and Rosen 1981; van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden 2001; 
Avrahami et al. 2017). However, it has been shown that this greater effort due to risk 
aversion may come at a cost as employees may channel this effort towards overly risky 
task strategies (e.g., Hannan, Krishnan, and Tafkov 2008) or efforts to sabotage their fellow 
peer employees (e.g., Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011). 
Peer competition also leads to increased effort because employees are driven by the 
innate motive to outperform others, as described by social comparison theory (e.g., Hannan 
et al. 2013), because the comparison of one’s performance, relative to their peers, can help 
improve one’s self-concept (e.g., Tafkov 2013). For example, regardless of economic 
incentives, Brown et al. (2014) show that employee reporting behavior in a budgeting task 
varies depending what dimension of performance they are ranked upon: firm performance 
versus individual performance. 
Thus, as described by social comparison theory, when peer competition is strong or 
made salient, employees will focus on their peer competitors to a greater extent because 
they are trying to acquire information that will allow them to determine their own relative 
performance in the hopes of improving their self-concept. I suggest that, because of this 
social comparison effect and subsequent focus on their peers, when other management 




likely to perceive these control devices through the lens of how the control affects their 
expected relative performance in the peer competition.  
Considering a saliently competitive setting where employees are not restricted, 
employees may be concerned that their peers would engage in behaviors that give them a 
potentially unfair advantage in the competition. For example, imagine a setting where 
employees are competing on performance and each employee has private information 
regarding their own performance. Employees would likely be concerned that their peers 
will exaggerate the extent of their own performance, thus putting the employee in question 
at a disadvantage, without that employee exaggerating themselves.  
A manager could choose to utilize a restrictive control in this setting by requiring 
all employees to report only their true performance. To work, this control would need to 
reduce the amount of private information between manager and employee. For example, 
managers could require supporting documentation, validation from other parties, or 
directly observe employee actions to verify the reported performance. Even if the 
employee’s private information is itself somewhat noisy, management could use restrictive 
controls to ensure the report of that performance is less biased. For example, if a project 
manager is reporting the percentage completed on a long-term project, management could 
employ a cost engineer to complete an independent evaluation of the percentage of the 
project completed, thus reducing the degree of private information and reducing the 
opportunity for a biased report from the project manager.  
I suggest that in such a setting with strong competition, employees are more likely 




the manager wanted to increase the procedural fairness of the peer competition. Procedural 
fairness is the degree to which an individual believes the procedures used to determine an 
outcome are appropriate, both in design and operation (Colquitt 2001).  
Employees are likely concerned with whether their peer employees would 
exaggerate their own performance thus harming the employee in question. Thus, 
employees are more likely to prefer a restriction over performance reporting, even one that 
restricts their own reporting behavior, to ensure the competition operates on an “even” 
playing field. In addition, prior research has shown that individuals prefer procedural 
fairness even if they do not directly benefit from it (e.g., Greenberg 1986), suggesting that 
even if a restrictive control is perceived to hurt an employee’s chances at a successful 
outcome, they may still appreciate the increased fairness in procedures.  
However, if there is weak peer competition, employees are less likely to focus on 
their peer employees as they are less likely to use that information to evaluate their own 
self-concept. Thus, employees under weak competitive settings are less likely to perceive 
managerial control devices through a lens of how the control affects themselves relative to 
their peers. As a result, employees are less likely to believe a manager chose to use the 
restrictive control to increase fairness. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H1: Employees are more likely to view restrictive controls as increasing fairness 
when they are in strong competitive settings than when they are not. 
H2: Employees are more likely to attribute the imposition of restrictive controls to 
a manager’s concern for fairness when they are in strong competitive settings than 




2.3 Employee Reciprocity 
 Positive reciprocity is doing a kind act for someone who intentionally did 
something to help you, while negative reciprocity is doing an unkind act for someone who 
intentionally did something to harm you (e.g., Hannan 2005, Rabin 1993, Cox and Deck 
2005). By definition, acts of reciprocity are voluntary, driven by an individual’s desire to 
repay the kind or unkind act. In an organizational setting, motivations and actions based on 
reciprocity are an economically relevant factor as few workspaces are completely 
contractible. Reciprocity becomes more pertinent the less complete employee contracts are, 
or more simply, as MCS’s become less thorough, reciprocity has a greater impact on 
organizational outcomes.  
 Acts of reciprocity are driven not just by whether the initial act is helpful or harmful, 
but also whether the act is perceived to have been intended to help or harm the recipient. 
What I suggest above is that the same action of a manager, imposing (or not imposing) a 
restrictive control over employees, is perceived to be driven by different motives depending 
on whether peer competition is strongly salient or not. Specifically, when peer employees 
are under strong competitive settings, employees are more likely to presume the manager’s 
motive for imposing a restrictive control is to make the peer competition fairer. As a result 
of these attributions of the manager’s control decision, I expect employees operating under 
strong peer competition to positively reciprocate to a greater degree towards a manager 
who chose to impose a restrictive control than a manager who chose not to impose a 




However, when employees are operating under weak peer competition, the above 
relationship should dissipate as a result of the reduced perceived relevance of fairness 
between peers. It is also possible that the relationship could reverse. When employees are 
under weak competitive settings or the competition is not a salient aspect of the workplace, 
employees are more likely to make different attributions regarding a manager’s motives 
behind their control decision. As I suggest above, employees are more likely to focus on 
how the restrictive control affects themselves in relation to how it also affects the manager.  
MCS mechanisms are designed and operationalized to ensure employees do what 
is in the best interest of the organization. In this setting, the restrictive control ensures 
employees reveal their private information to the benefit of the manager. Since it is within 
the capabilities of employees to reveal this private information absent the restrictive 
control, employees are likely to attribute the manager’s decision to impose the control to 
the manager not trusting employees to reveal their private information absent the control 
(e.g., Christ 2013, Falk and Kosfeld 2006).  
Conversely, if the manger chooses to not restrict the employees, employees may 
attribute this decision to the manager trusting employees. Numerous studies have shown 
that individuals reciprocate positively when another individual trusts them and reciprocate 
negatively when another individual distrusts them (e.g., Cox, Kerschbamer, and Neururer 
2016, Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007). Thus, I expect that when peer competition is not 
salient, employees will positively reciprocate towards a manager who chose not to impose 
a restrictive control to a greater degree than a manager who chose to impose a restrictive 




H3a: Employees operating under weak peer competition will positively reciprocate to 
a greater degree when the manager chose to not impose a restrictive control as 
compared to when the manager chose to impose a restrictive control.  
H3b: Employees operating under strong peer competition will positively reciprocate 
to a greater degree when the manager chose to impose a restrictive control as 





CHAPTER 3.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
3.1 Experimental Design 
I conducted a 2 x 2 (peer competition x restrictive control) between-subjects 
experiment with participants randomly assigned into groups of four. Each group member 
was assigned a role, one member was assigned the role of manager, Orange Player, with 
the remaining three group members assigned the role of employee, Blue Player. The neutral 
terms, Orange and Blue Player were used in lieu of manager and employee, respectively, 
to mitigate any effects from connotations associated with the terms manager and 
employee.1  
These roles were randomly assigned and were not based on any knowledge, skill, 
or other individual characteristics, revealed or reported. By doing so, I sought to remove 
the possibility that participants would perceive others as having earned their position or 
status. It is likely that perceptions of earned status would affect employee attributions, 
beliefs and responses to managers and their control implementation decisions. However, 
this was not part of my research question, so I chose to experimentally remove this aspect 
by randomly assigning participant to roles. 
The study consists of two stages. The first stage includes a real-effort task (i.e. 
decoding task, explained in detail in the following section) and a reporting task (reporting 
one’s performance from the decoding task). The second stage consists of an additional 
                                                          




round of the decoding task intended to measure levels of positive or negative reciprocity. 
Afterwards, participants respond to a post-experimental questionnaire (PEQ). 
Each group of four participants was randomly assigned to one of two peer 
competition conditions, either to strong peer competition condition or weak peer 
competition condition. In the weak peer competition condition employees earned $0.50 for 
every puzzle reported in Stage 1. Thus, in the weak peer competition condition employee 
earnings were independent of their peer employees. Conversely, for those assigned to the 
strong peer competition condition, employee earnings were dependent on peer employee 
reports. Specifically, in the strong peer competition condition the employee who reported 
the greatest number of puzzles solved within each group earned $19.00, while the other 
two employees in the group each earned $6.00. Thus, while competition can be induced in 
many ways, I selected to induce it via an explicit tournament-based incentive scheme. To 
keep the magnitude of incentives approximately equal across conditions while minimizing 
the salience of competitive cues, I provided those in the weak peer competition condition 
a piece-rate incentive scheme. 
Theory and prior evidence suggest that for individuals to hold another accountable 
for the imposition of a control, it must be completely clear that the other individual chose 
to implement the control (Christ 2013). As a result, instead of assigning employees to 
restrictive control conditions, I randomly assigned them to groups, and the manager in that 
group, prior to the decoding task, chose whether or not to impose the restrictive control 
over employees’ reporting behavior (no restrictive control vs. yes restrictive control). The 
restrictive control, when imposed, restricted employees to report the number of puzzles 




imposed, employees could report anywhere between zero and two times (2x) the number 
of puzzles actually solved in the decoding task. I chose to operationalize the restrictive 
control via a restriction over reporting (i.e., a control to reduce private information). At a 
construct level, this is consistent with past operationalizations as the restrictive control 
reduces the options employee can engage in, and the options no longer available to the 
employee were harmful to the manager and beneficial to the employee in question. 
Beyond knowing he/she was in a group with three other individuals, participants 
had no information about the other participants in their group. Thus, this design allows me 
to achieve the necessary setting (i.e., a fellow participant making the control decision) 
while maintaining random assignment of employees to restrictive control conditions, by 
randomly assigning them to managers. In addition, by having no other information beyond 
what is described above, I ensure there is a greater competitive sentiment in the strong peer 
competition condition.  
3.2 Procedures 
Participants were recruited via an experimental lab participant pool at a large south-
eastern university in the US. In total, 268 undergraduate students participated in one of ten 
experimental sessions, earning on average $15 including a $5 participation fee.  
Participants arrived at the lab and were seated at individual computer terminals. The study 
was run on oTree, an open source online software program designed to run interactive 
studies and experiments (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016). In total, 268 students 
participated in the study. Of these, 67 were assigned the manager role, and 201 assigned 




a result, I ended with a sample size of 200 employees. After reading the consent form and 
agreeing to participate, participants were notified that they were (1) randomly placed into 
groups of four with other participants in the computer lab and (2) assigned one of two roles: 
manager or employee.2  
Groups of four were used for at least three reasons. First, to ensure employees felt 
they had a reasonable chance at winning the higher wage in the peer competition present 
condition, I did not want groups to be too large. However, one participant per group, the 
manager, was there to initiate the restrictive control decision thus not providing an 
observation of employee response. As a result, I wanted to minimize the number of 
participants used in this role, relative to the employee role. In addition, prior literature 
investigating the effects of restrictive controls in group settings used a similar group size 
(e.g., Garrett 2017).  
All participants were then provided the rules of the decoding task (e.g., Chow 1983) 
and engaged in a four-minute practice round. This was to ensure all participants, regardless 
of role, were familiar with the task that would generate earnings for participants in the 
study. The decoding task was structured such that individuals were provided (1) a key in 
which each digit, zero through nine, was matched with a letter of the English alphabet, and 
(2) a puzzle: a series of randomly ordered 8 digits (0 through 9, with replacement). The 
goal of the task was to solve as many puzzles as possible in four minutes by submitting the 
correct sequence of letters corresponding to the puzzle, based on the key. This task was 
selected because performance is chiefly driven by effort intensity as opposed to individual 
                                                          




ability or skill, therefore reducing the potential that individual participants thought 
themselves or others had an unfair (dis)advantage in the task (Choi, Clark and Presslee 
2018). In addition, by using a relatively challenging task where mistakes and errors could 
be made, I created the opportunity for participants to self-justify overreporting 
performance. 
Participants were provided a counter indicating the number of puzzles they had 
correctly solved, updated instantly during the task, as well as a countdown clock to ensure 
they were aware of their remaining time. Participants were able to submit incorrect 
solutions to puzzles and were provided immediate ex-post feedback evidenced by the 
counter of total puzzles solved not increasing after submitting the puzzle. The instrument 
did provide some ex ante feedback: participants were (1) alerted if they attempted to submit 
an incorrect quantity of letters (e.g., if they typed in nine letters instead of eight) and (2) 
inhibited from typing anything but letters into the text space.  
After a practice round, participants were provided the procedures and incentives for 
Stages 1 and 2 of the experiment. First, they learned how both manager and employees 
earned their compensation in Stage 1. Employee stage 1 earnings depended on which peer 
competition condition their group was assigned (explained in the previous section). 
Regardless of condition, manager stage 1 earnings increased $1.00 for every puzzle their 
associated employees solved and decreased $0.50 for every puzzle reported by their 
associated employees’. Thus, managers had an economic interest in employees reporting 




All participants were informed that prior to the “live” round of the decoding task 
the manager would choose whether to implement the restrictive control. The restrictive 
control was labeled “Reporting Rule” in the experiment. This term was used to reduce 
potential negative effects triggered by using the terms “restrictive” and “control,” while 
“Reporting Rule” seems both descriptive and relatively neutral. If the manager chose to 
enact the control, each employee was required to report the number of puzzles they solved. 
If the manager chose to not impose the control, employees were free to report an amount 
ranging from 0 (zero) up to two times (2x) the number of puzzles they actually solved. The 
manager’s restrictive control decision would apply to all three employees in his/her group.  
The employees were aware the manager was making this decision but would not be 
informed of the decision outcome until after the “live” round of the decoding task was 
completed. Employees were informed of the restrictive control decision after performing 
the stage 1 decoding task to ensure reciprocity did not play a role in their stage 1 effort as 
any positive reciprocity would be conflated with employee self-interested behavior. In 
addition, employees were informed of the restrictive control decision before reporting 
stage 1 performance to create a strong manipulation of a restrictive control (i.e., the control 
restricts employee behavior prior to employees choosing their behavior). Importantly, the 
manager could never view the individual employee reports but only learned, in aggregate, 
how employees affected manager earnings. This design choice was made to ensure an 
employee’s decision whether to overreport was not influenced by an external social 
pressure to be honest. 
Participants then learned about the second stage of the study. All participants were 




affect the manager’s earnings and that the manager had no recourse or decision-making 
power to influence the employees’ actions in the second stage. Finally, all this information 
was summarized, and participants responded to comprehension and manipulation check 
questions. If a participant responded incorrectly to any of the comprehension or 
manipulation check questions, they were presented with a message indicating why their 
response was wrong and needed to correctly re-respond to all questions before proceeding 
with the study.  
Employees then participated in the “live” round of the decoding task. After 
completing the four-minute “live” round, employees were presented with the number of 
puzzles he/she actually solved and learned the manager’s restrictive control decision. After 
being reminded of each players earnings function and reiterating what the scenario would 
be like if the manager had made a different restrictive control decision, employees 
submitted their reports.  
Employees were then provided the detailed instructions to the second stage of the 
study, which consisted of a modified version of the Moonlighting Game (Abbink, 
Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000). Employees were informed that they could affect the 
manager’s earnings by participating in another round of the decoding task. The same task 
from Stage 1 was used in Stage 2 to minimize participants viewing the two stages as 
separate settings or experiments. Each employee could elect to have solved puzzles in this 
additional round either increase or decrease (positive and negative reciprocity, 
respectively) the manager’s earnings by $0.50 a puzzle. Alternatively, they could choose 




In Stage 2, solved puzzles had no effect on employee earnings. However, to ensure 
reciprocity was a costly action beyond that of the real effort put forth by employees, time 
spent participating in the additional round affected employee earnings.3 Specifically, at the 
beginning of Stage 2 each employee was endowed with an additional $1. Then, for every 
three seconds an employee participated in the additional round, $0.01 was deducted from 
their endowment, such that if an employee participated in the additional round for the 
maximum time (five minutes), the full $1.00 endowment would be lost. Employees were 
free to engage in the additional round for as long as they wanted up to the five-minute 
maximum. Employees were informed that managers would earn at least the $5 participation 
fee. Thus, employees knew they could not reduce a manager’s earnings below $5. 
However, employees were not aware of the manager’s aggregate Stage 1 earnings, creating 
uncertainty on the net affect any positive or negative reciprocity would have on the 
manager. 
After making their Stage 2 decisions and participating in the additional round of 
the decoding task, if selected, all participants responded to a post-experimental 
questionnaire. Finally, participants learned their total earnings broken down by 
participation fee, stage 1 earnings, and stage 2 earnings and were paid in cash prior to 
leaving the laboratory.  
 
                                                          
3 Since participants had to wait till the experimental session was complete to receive payment, the 
participants may have viewed their time spent in the lab as a fixed cost. Thus, they may have engaged in 
the Stage 2 task to pass the time. To ensure that Stage 2 effort was costly, I imposed an explicit cost of time 


































CHAPTER 4.  RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in the introduction, I ran the study under two different parameters (cost 
regime). In the first experiment, managers could impose the restrictive control at no cost 
(i.e., $0); in the second, managers were assessed a fee of $6 to impose the restrictive 
control. In the $0 cost regime all managers chose to impose the restrictive control, meaning 
I only observe two of the intended four conditions under the $0 cost regime. Thus, all 
statistical test under the $0 cost regime are testing the simple main effect between peer 
competition conditions under the yes restrictive control condition. In the $6 cost regime, I 
observe both Yes and No restrictive control conditions. However, cell sizes are 
significantly unbalanced. Therefore, I first present the test of hypotheses within the two 
cost regimes, respectively. I then provide an exploratory comparison across cost regimes. 
4.2 $0 Cost Regime 
4.2.1 Stage 1 Performance 
Before testing the hypotheses, I first evaluate whether employee participants solved 
approximately the same number of decoding puzzles in the first stage of the study. This is 
to ensure that (1) peer competition conditions did not lead to significantly different effort 
levels and (2) random assignment adequately spread high and low ability individuals across 
conditions. In untabulated results, Stage 1 decoding task performance did not differ across 
conditions (11.44 vs. 11.61, p = .850, two-tailed). Thus, I do not find evidence to suggest 




4.2.2 Test of Hypotheses 
Recall, H1 predicts peer competition will moderate the effect of the manager’s 
restrictive control decision on employee fairness perceptions of the control decision, such 
that employees in the strong peer competition condition will perceive the manager’s 
decision to impose the restrictive control as fairer than employees in the weak peer 
competition condition. To test this, I elicited the following question, “To what extent do 
you believe this aspect of the study was fair: The Manager’s Reporting Rule Decision.” 
arranged as a 7-point likert-type question ranging from “Very Unfair” to “Very Fair.” The 
responses were coded from -3 to +3, respectively. As predicted, employees in the strong 
peer competition condition found the manager’s decision to impose the restrictive control 
to be (marginally) fairer than those in the weak peer competition condition, (Table 1, Panel 
B, t = -1.477, p = .075, one-tailed).  
 
Table 1: Experiment 1 – Cost Regime = $0, Perceived Fairness of Restrictive Control 
Outcome 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $0 
 

















Table 1 (continued): Experiment 1 – Cost Regime = $0, Perceived Fairness of 
Restrictive Control Outcome 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = Yes 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 34 -1.477 .075 




Figure 2a: $0 Cost Regime - Perceived Fairness of Restrictive Control Outcome  
 
 
H2 goes on to predict that peer competition will moderate the effect of the 
manager’s restrictive control decision on employee attributions as to why the manager 
made their restrictive control decision, such that employees in the strong peer competition 
condition will infer that the manager’s decision to impose the restrictive control was 
motivated more so by fairness concerns than those in the weak peer competition condition. 
To test this, I elicited the following question, “How much do you think the Orange Player 
was concerned with how fair the study was?” arranged as a 7-point likert-type question 



























respectively. Counter to my prediction, those in the weak peer competition condition 
believed their manager was more concerned with fairness than those in the strong peer 
competition condition, however, this difference was not statistically significant (Table 2, 
Panels A & B). Therefore, while I find marginal evidence that employees in the strong peer 
competition condition view the imposed restrictive control more so as a mechanism of 
fairness, they do not attribute this improvement to the manager or their motivations. 
 
Table 2: Experiment 1 – Cost Regime = $0, Attribution of Manager’s Fairness 
Motivation for Restrictive Control Decision 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $0 
 




















Panel B: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = Yes 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 34 0.720 .762 







Figure 2b: $0 Cost Regime - Attribution of Manager’s Fairness Motivation for 




As a result of the increase in perceived fairness from the imposition of the 
restrictive control in the strong peer competition condition, H3b predicts that employees 
in the strong peer competition condition will positively reciprocate toward their manager 
to a greater degree than those in the weak peer competition condition. To test this, I use the 
number of puzzles employees solved in the second stage of the study. Recall, in Stage 2 
employees could choose to increase or decrease manager earnings by solving puzzles in an 
additional round of the decoding task. Employees could also choose to do neither and not 
affect manager’s earnings. Puzzles solved to increase (decrease) manager earnings were 
coded as positive (negative) values. Employees who chose to not affect manager earnings 
by not participating in the Stage 2 decoding task were assigned a value of zero (0) for this 
measure. As predicted employees in the strong peer competition condition positively 
reciprocated to a greater degree than those in the weak peer competition condition (Table 





























Table 3: Experiment 1 – Cost Regime = $0, Reciprocity 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $0 
 





















Panel B: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = Yes 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 34 -3.258 .001 


























While there does not appear to be any difference in decoding task ability between 
conditions, it is possible that individuals with greater ability in the decoding task could 
solve more puzzles in the second stage of the study, and this ability may be associated with 
levels of reciprocity. To address this, I construct an additional measure of reciprocity in an 
attempt to control for differences in ability. Specifically, I take the number of puzzles 
solved in the second stage of the study (Reciprocity) and divide it by the number of puzzles 
solved in the first stage of the study, generating a measure of reciprocity scaled on each 
employee’s ability (Reciprocity Ratio). While I suggest Stage 1 performance is primarily 
driven by effort intensity, I believe this is the best proxy for task ability that I have available 
in the study. Specifically, I believe Stage 1 performance is more informative than the 
practice round performance as practice round performance is likely noisy due to 
participants learning how to perform the task and developing a strategy that works for them. 
As predicted, Employees in the strong peer competition condition positive reciprocated to 
a greater degree than those in the weak peer competition condition (Table 4, Panel B, t = -




















Table 4: Experiment 1 – Cost Regime = $0, Reciprocity Ratio 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $0 
 






















Panel B: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = Yes 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 34 -3.265 .001 





























In total, these results suggest that employees respond more positively to a 
manager’s decision to impose a restrictive control when employees are under strong peer 
competition versus weak peer competition, because the restrictive control increases 
perceived fairness, even though the employees do not believe the manager’s decision was 
motivated by fairness. I am also interested in how employees react to a manager decision 
to not impose a restrictive control. However, in the first experiment, no managers make 
this choice and thus I was unable to fully test H1 and H2, nor test H3a at all. To address 
this, I ran the study again under modified parameters in an attempt to observe both 
conditions of the restrictive control decision. 
4.3 $6 Cost Regime 
 My goal in running the study under modified parameters was to observe 
approximately equal observations of yes and no restrictive control conditions. Recall, each 
manager chooses whether to impose the restrictive control over their employees. To 
encourage more managers to choose no restrictive control I made two modifications. First, 
managers were assessed a fee if they chose to impose the restrictive control ($6); this 
information was known to all participants. In addition, I also expanded the initial 
instructions detailing how employees could affect manager earnings in Stage 2.  
 The modifications did increase the rate of managers choosing no restrictive control. 
Specifically, 78% (22%) of managers chose to not impose (impose) the restrictive control 
under the $6 cost regime. Ex ante, I did not expect these modifications to have a moderating 
effect on employee fairness perceptions and reciprocity behavior. However, this 




4.3.1 Stage 1 Performance and Reporting 
Again, I evaluate whether employees solved approximately the same number of 
decoding puzzles in the first stage of the study. To test this, I run an OLS regression with 
two fixed factors: peer competition and restrictive control. In untabulated results, I find no 
significant main effects or interaction. Therefore, there I find no evidence to suggest 
employee ability or effort differed between manipulated conditions. 
I also compare the rate at which employees over-reported their Stage 1 
performance. This comparison only includes employees in the no restrictive control 
conditions because those in the yes restrictive control conditions did not have the 
opportunity to misreport. I do not make an explicit hypothesis, but it is likely individuals 
in the strong peer competition condition would misreport to a greater degree than those in 
the weak peer competition condition because of the additional competition-based 
motivations. To test this, I construct a measure of actual misreporting divided by the total 
amount an individual could potentially misreport (Misreport %). While employees in the 
strong peer competition condition do misreport to a greater degree, the difference does not 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance (untabulated: 0.696 vs. 0.755, t = -.777, 
p = .439, two-tailed). 
4.3.2 Test of Hypotheses 
Recall, H1 predicts that employees under the strong peer competition condition will 
perceive the manager’s decision to impose (not impose) the restrictive control as fairer 
(less fair) than employees in the weak peer competition condition. Per Table 5, Panel A 




differ across peer competition conditions in the no restrictive control condition. Second, 
and surprisingly, employees view the manager’s decision to impose the restrictive control 
as fairer in the weak peer competition condition as compared to strong peer competition 
condition. While this simple main effect does not reach conventional levels of significance, 
the means are in the opposite direction of my prediction and opposite of those found under 
the $0 cost regime. In addition, similar to the first run of the experiment, I do not find 
results consistent with H2 (see Table 6, Panel A and B). 
 
Table 5: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Perceived Fairness of Restrictive Control 
Outcome 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $6 




















N = 59 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Restrictive Control Decision 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition 0.274 .286 0.96 0.340 (-0.291, 0.839) 
Restrictive Control -0.199 .505 -0.39 0.693 (-1.196, 0.797) 
Interaction -0.941 .638 -1.47 0.142 (-2.201, 0.320) 
Intercept 1.116 .194 5.75 <0.001 (0.732, 1.500) 






Figure 3a: $6 Cost Regime - Perceived Fairness of Restrictive Control Outcome  
 
 
Table 6: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Attribution of Manager’s Fairness 
Motivation for Restrictive Control Decision 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $6 





















N = 59 
 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Restrictive Control Decision  
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition 0.106 .327 0.32 0.746 (-0.539, 0.751) 
Restrictive Control -0.558 .576 -0.97 0.334 (-1.696, 0.580) 
Interaction -0.106 .729 -0.15 0.885 (-1.545, 1.333) 
Intercept 0.725 .222 3.27 0.001 (0.287, 1.163) 




























Figure 3b: $6 Cost Regime - Attribution of Manager’s Fairness Motivation for 
Restrictive Control Decision  
 
 
H3a predict that employees will positively reciprocate more under weak peer 
competition as compared to the strong peer competition condition within the no restrictive 
control condition. As a reminder, this hypothesis was untestable under the $0 cost regime 
as all managers chose to impose the restrictive control. H3b predicts that this behavior 
should flip when the restriction is imposed: those in the strong peer competition condition 
will positively reciprocate more as compared to those in the weak peer competition 
condition, as was observed within the $0 cost regime. Since in summation H3a and H3b 
suggest an interaction, I first run an omnibus test with a 2x2 full factorial OLS regression, 
and then test each hypothesis individually with a t-test. 
Per Tables 7 and 8, Panel B, the OLS omnibus regression analysis shows no 
significant interaction effect. Surprisingly, there is a marginally significant main effect: 
employees in the weak peer competition condition positively reciprocated to a greater 


























or not the restrictive control was imposed. While I do not find support for the combined 
prediction of H3a and H3b, I go on to test each hypothesis separately.  
 
Table 7: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Reciprocity 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $6 























N = 59 
 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Restrictive Control Decision 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition -1.562 .923 -1.69 0.093 (-3.384, 0.261) 
Restrictive Control 0.163 1.628 0.10 0.920 (-3.051, 3.378) 
Interaction -1.563 2.058 -0.76 0.449 (-5.628, 2.502) 
Intercept 2.087 .626 3.33 0.001 (0.850, 3.324) 











Table 8: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Reciprocity Ratio 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Cost Regime = $6 























N = 59 
 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Restrictive Control Decision 
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition -0.128 .083 -1.55 0.124 (-0.291, 0.035) 
Restrictive Control 0.090 .146 0.62 0.538 (-0.198, 0.378) 
Interaction -0.201 .184 -1.09 0.276 (-0.566, 0.163) 
Intercept 0.169 .056 3.00 0.003 (0.058, 0.279) 
























Figure 3d: $6 Cost Regime - Reciprocity Ratio 
 
 
To test H3a I compared weak peer competition to strong peer competition under 
the no restrictive control condition. The results support my prediction that when the 
restrictive control is not imposed, employees reward their manager more so when they 
operate under the weak peer competition condition versus those operating the strong peer 
competition condition (reciprocity: Table 7, Panel C, t = 1.724, p = .044, one-tailed; 
reciprocity ratio: Table 8, Panel C, t = 1.663, p = .049, one-tailed).  
 
Table 7: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Reciprocity 
 
Panel C: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = No 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 126 1.724 .044 



























Table 8: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Reciprocity Ratio 
 
Panel C: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = No 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 126 1.663 .049 
      *Bold p-values represent 1-tailed test 
 
To test H3b I compared weak peer competition to strong peer competition under 
the yes restrictive control condition. The results do not support my prediction and are 
marginally significant in the opposite direction, directly counter to the results found under 
the $0 cost regime. Specifically, under the $6 cost regime, when the restrictive control is 
imposed, employees reward their manager less so in the strong peer competition condition 
versus those in the weak peer competition condition (reciprocity: Table 7, Panel D, t = 
1.594, p = .940, one-tailed; reciprocity ratio: Table 8, Panel D, t = 1.631, p = .944, one-
tailed).  
 
Table 7: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Reciprocity 
 
Panel D: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = Yes 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 34 1.594 .940 











Table 8: Experiment 2 – Cost Regime = $6, Reciprocity Ratio 
 
Panel D: Peer Competition | Restrictive Control Decision = Yes 
 
 df t-stat p-value 
Peer Competition 34 1.631 .944 
      *Bold p-values represent 1-tailed test 
 
This suggests that the level of cost incurred by the manager to impose the restrictive 
control (i.e., the cost regime) affected employees’ perceptions and reactions to the 
manager’s restrictive control decision. To further investigate this unexpected difference, I 
go on to compare the two cost regimes when the restrictive control is imposed. 
4.4 Exploratory Analysis Across Cost Regimes 
Ex ante, I did not predict a moderating effect of assessing the manager a fee (to 
impose the restrictive control) on employee fairness perceptions and reciprocity. However, 
based on the above results this actually appears to be the case. Before performing 
exploratory analysis in an attempt to understand the different results across cost regimes, I 
first confirm that reciprocity behavior within the yes restrictive control condition flips 
across cost regimes as is descriptively observed in the above results. To test this, I run an 
OLS regression with two fixed factors: peer competition and cost regime, under the yes 
restrictive control condition. Per Table 9, Panel B, the cost regime significantly moderates 
the effect of peer competition on reciprocity (t = 3.37, p = .001, two-tailed). Results are 
inferentially equivalent for reciprocity ratio (Table 10, Panel B: t = 3.27, p = .002, two-
tailed). This result suggests that as the cost incurred by the firm to restrict employees 




when they are under weak competitive settings. However, employees who are restricted 




Table 9: Exploratory Analysis - Reciprocity 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Restrictive Control Decision 
= Yes 
 






















N = 18 
 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Cost Regime  
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition -3.125 1.921 -1.63 0.108 (-6.958, 0.708) 
Cost Regime -4.583 2.025 -2.26 0.027 (-8.624, -0.543) 
Interaction 8.903 2.640 3.37 0.001 (3.635, 14.171) 
Intercept 2.250 1.568 1.43 0.156 (-0.880, 5.380) 










Table 10: Exploratory Analysis - Reciprocity Ratio 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Restrictive Control Decision 
= Yes 
 






















N = 18 
 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Cost Regime  
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition -0.329 .181 -1.82 0.074 (-0.691, 0.032) 
Cost Regime -0.457 .191 -2.39 0.019 (-0.838, -0.076) 
Interaction 0.815 .249 3.27 0.002 (0.318, 1.312) 
Intercept 0.259 .148 1.75 0.085 (-0.037, 0.554) 























Figure 4b: Exploratory Analysis - Reciprocity Ratio 
 
 
 To better understand the effect the cost regime had on employees, I also compare 
the perceived fairness of the restrictive control decision across peer competition conditions. 
The results show a marginally significant interaction between peer competition and cost 
regime (Table 11, Panel B, t = 1.70, p = .094, two-tailed). Looking at the simple main 
effects, under the weak peer competition condition employees perceived the manager’s 
decision to impose the restrictive control to be fairer when the cost to implement control 
was greater (untabulated: 0.92 vs. -0.61, t = 2.608, p = .015, two-tailed). Thus, this suggests 
that for employees in weak competitive settings, the cost incurred by the firm to restrict 
employees affects employee perceptions of how fair that restriction is. However, this same 
analysis yields no differences when comparing the cost regimes under the strong peer 
competition condition (untabulated: 0.22 vs. 0.25, t = 0.045, p = .964, two-tailed). 
Therefore, something else besides explicit perceived fairness may explain the differences 

























Table 11: Exploratory Analysis - Perceived Fairness of Restrictive Control Outcome 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Restrictive Control Decision 
= Yes 
 






















N = 18 
 
 
Panel B: Peer Competition x Cost Regime  
 
 Coefficient Std. Err t-stat p-value Conf. Interval 
Peer Competition -0.667 .643 -1.04 0.303 (-1.949, 0.616) 
Cost Regime -1.528 .678 -2.25 0.027 (-2.880, -0.176) 
Interaction 1.500 .884 1.70 0.094 (-0.263, 3.263) 
Intercept 0.917 .525 1.75 0.085 (-0.131, 1.964) 








Figure 4c: Exploratory Analysis - Perceived Fairness of Restrictive Control 
Outcome 
 
 I also elicited a measure as to how much employees contemplated the manager’s 
restrictive control decision, “How much did you think about/care about the Orange Player’s 
Reporting Rule decision?” arranged as a 7-point likert-type question with responses 
ranging from “None at all” to “A great deal.” The responses were coded from -3 to +3, 
respectively. While not hypothesized, I find that, in the strong peer competition condition, 
employees under the $0 cost regime reported to have thought about the restrictive control 
decision to a greater extent than those under the $6 cost regime (untabulated: 1.33 vs. 0.42, 
t = -1.791, p = .081, two-tailed). This suggests that, under strong peer competitive settings, 
the more employees contemplate a manager’s decision to restrict them, the more employees 
choose to reward that manager. I am unable to claim, theoretically or empirically, whether 



























CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
 
Using an experiment, I investigate whether and how the strength or saliency of peer 
competition affects employee perceptions and reaction to a manager’s choice to (or not to) 
impose a restrictive control over employees. The study finds mixed results. As predicted, 
when a manager chooses not to restrict employees, employees respond more favorably 
towards the manager when those employees are under weak competitive settings as 
opposed to strong competitive settings. However, when a manager chooses to restrict 
employees, employee responses not only depend upon the peer competitive setting, but 
also depends upon the cost incurred by management to impose the restriction. When the 
cost of imposing the restrictive control is low (high), employees operating under strong 
(weak) peer competition reciprocate more positively. In addition, it appears the effect of 
control implementation cost is driven by both the attention given to and the perceived 
fairness of the restrictive control decision.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, much of the literature 
investigating behavioral responses to controls has focused on how controls affect 
employee’s perceptions of trust, a social preference, between themselves and their 
manager. My study broadens this research program by investigating how the imposition of 
restrictive controls may affect another social preference, a desire for fairness. Specifically, 
this study suggests that both the degree of peer competition and the cost of imposing 
controls may affect employees’ perceived fairness of a manager’s control decision, thus 




In addition, prior research in this program has primarily focused on employee 
responses within the controlled task. My study provides evidence that employee reciprocity 
resulting from restrictive controls, is not limited to reciprocity responses within the 
controlled task, by can carry over to other tasks employees perform for their managers. 
Thus, my results provide support to the robustness and generalizability of the findings 
observed in the prior literature. 
Second, this study informs the performance evaluation literature. This expansive 
literature has provided evidence on the benefits and downsides to using competition (e.g., 
relative performance evaluation) to motivate and evaluate employees (for reviews see Luft 
2016, Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). This literature has identified numerous organizational 
and environmental features that should be considered when determined whether and to 
what degree to utilize relative performance in evaluating employees (e.g., systematic 
versus unsystematic noise in the task or environment, riskiness of employee effort 
strategies, the degree to which employees can directly affect each other’s performance). 
This study adds to this stream by identifying a widely used control mechanism, restrictive 
controls, that should be considered when management is determining whether and to what 
degree employees should be evaluated relatively to peers. 
This study is not without its limitations. First, and most notably, I do not observe 
managers choosing not to implement the restrictive control when the cost to implement 
said control is low ($0). Thus, I can only make claims as to how employees would react to 
a manager’s decision not to implement a control when implementation costs are relatively 
high ($6). In addition, I chose to investigate a specific form of a restrictive control: a control 




findings are driven by the unique setting of reporting performance. Future research could 
investigate whether these findings would generalize to other forms of a restrictive control 
(e.g., restrictions over procedures or choices, restrictions over reporting costs, or ex post 
review-based restrictions). Also, I chose to operationalize the manager (individual who 
makes the control decision) as the residual claimant of the organization. Future research 
could examine whether the nature of the manager’s incentives influences employee 
responses to the manager’s control decisions. Lastly, I chose a real-effort task for which 
performance is primarily driven by effort intensity, leaving little room for strategy 
development and individual differences in skill to play a role in employee performance. 
Future research could explore whether the nature of the effortful task moderates employee 





APPENDIX A. MANIPULATIONS 
 
 
Peer Competition Manipulation 
No Peer Competition 
In particular, Blue Players will earn $0.50 times the number of puzzles they 
REPORT solving correctly. 
Blue Player earnings = (REPORTED X $0.50 per puzzle) 
Note that each of the Blue Player ’s earnings are INDEPENDENT of the amount 
REPORTED by the other Blue Players in their group 
Meaning the Blue Players within your group CANNOT affect each other's 
earnings (the other Blue Players in their group), regardless of each Blue Player’s 
REPORTED puzzles solved 
 
Peer Competition 
In particular, Blue Players will earn $19.00 or $6.00, with the Blue Player who 
REPORTS the greatest number of puzzles (in their group) earning $19.00 and the 
other Blue Players earning $6.00. 
Blue Player earnings = $19.00 if their REPORTED > REPORTED by the 
other Blue Players, otherwise $6.00. 
Note that each of the Blue Player ’s earnings are DEPENDENT on the amount 
REPORTED by the other Blue Players in each group 
Meaning the Blue Players within your group CAN affect each other's earnings 
(the other Blue Players in their group), by REPORTing a greater number of 
puzzles than the other Blue Players 
 
Restrictive Control Manipulation 
Yes Restrictive Control 
 The Orange Player chose to enact the REPORTING RULE 
As a result, you (and the other Blue Players in your group) must REPORT the 
amount you actually SOLVED (as indicated above) 
As a reminder, IF the Orange Player had chosen not to enact the REPORTING 
RULE, you (and the other Blue Players in your group) could have REPORT an 




No Restrictive Control 
 The Orange Player chose not to enact the REPORTING RULE 
As a result, you (and the other Blue Players in your group) are free to REPORT 
an amount ranging from 0 (zero) to 2 times the amount you actually SOLVED 
(number SOLVED is indicated above) 
As a reminder, IF the Orange Player had chosen to enact the REPORTING 
RULE, you (and the other Blue Players in your group) would have been required 













APPENDIX C. RECIPROCITY TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Effect of Reciprocity on Manager 
 
In Stage 2 you, as a Blue Player, have the choice to either (1) increase, (2) decrease or (3) 
not affect the Orange Player earnings. 
 
Specifically, you will be given the choice to participate in an addition 5-minute (300-
second) round of the decoding task. 
 
If you choose to participate in the Stage 2 Round 
For every puzzle you solve correctly you affect the Orange Player’s earnings by 
$0.50: 
If you choose to increase: The Orange Player’s earnings increase by $0.50 
for each puzzle solved 
If you chose to decrease: The Orange Player’s earnings decrease by $0.50 
for each puzzle solved 
If you choose not to participate in the Stage 2 Round 
The Orange Player’s earnings will remain as they were at the end of Stage 1. 
 
Cost of Reciprocity to Employee 
Solved puzzles have no effect on your earnings, nor on the earnings of any other Blue 
Players. However, the time you spend participating in the Stage 2 Round will affect your 
earnings 
Specifically, you have been given an additional $1.00 
If you choose not to participate in the Stage 2 round of the Decoding Task 
You will retain the full $1.00 and it will be paid out to you in addition to your 
Stage 1 earnings and participation fee 
If you choose to participate in the Stage 2 round of the Decoding Task 
For every 3 seconds you participate in the Stage 2 Round, $0.01 (one cent) will be 
deducted from the additional $1.00 
For example: if you participate in the additional decoding task round for 4 
minutes and then click “End Round”, forgoing the last 1 minute of the round, you 
will earn $0.20 (60 unused seconds divided by 3 second units) 
If you participate in the Stage 2 Round for the full 5 minutes (300 seconds), the 
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